I. INTRODUCTION
As urban water utilities confront increasingly scarce and less reliable water supplies due to population growth, environmental regulation, and climate variability, water managers are seeking opportunities to reduce residential water demand. While the adoption of nonprice instruments (e.g., short-term water restrictions, subsidies for water-saving technologies, and public-awareness campaigns) likely will continue to be wide spread, volumetric pricing and, in particular, block rate pricing are gaining traction. This is not surprising to economists who have long espoused the merits of pricing as an efficient and effective means to address water scarcity (e.g., Howe and Linaweaver 1967; Chesnutt and Beecher 1998; Renwick and Green 2000; Griffin 2001; Dalhuisen et al. 2003; Olmstead and Stavins 2009; Grafton et al. 2011) . One challenge confronting water utilities that are considering switching to volumetric pricing is identifying the particular rate structure that is best suited to their needs. One structure that is increasingly being adopted by California water utilities is the increasing block rate water budget.
Increasing block rate (IBR) water budgets (which we refer to herein more simply as "water budgets") are a particular type of escalating tiered price structure in which the block sizes are based on household-specific characteristics (e.g., household size, irrigated area), environmental conditions (e.g., evapotranspiration), and a judgment by the water utility with regard to what constitutes "efficient" water use given those characteristics and conditions. This means that price structures can differ across households at any given time, and through time for any given household. Water budgets are a relatively new pricing tool. One of the earliest adopters was the Irvine Ranch Water District (IRWD) in southern California, which instituted such pricing in the early 1990s (IRWD 2013) .
Water budgets are thought to have significant advantages over more commonly used rate structures. 1 Foremost, water budgets provide utilities with the means to promote conservation through appropriate price signals while also maintaining fiscal balance. Under water budget pricing, each household pays a higher price for additional water only when total consumption exceeds that household's "efficient" level of use for the current billing period (Mayer et al. 2008) . Hall (2009) argues that the conservation incentives provided by water budgets are even stronger than those provided by standard IBR pricing with fixed volumetric blocks, because water budgets adjust the blocks according to the characteristics of each household. Thus both large and small households pay higher prices as consumption increases, whereas small households would rarely enter the upper blocks under a standard IBR price structure. Hall (2009) notes that this feature also improves the economic efficiency of water budgets because all households consume marginal water, and the marginal cost of water supply tends to be increasing. Furthermore, by more closely matching the price structure to the cost of supply, water budgets help utilities maintain fiscal balance despite potentially significant demand fluctuations. Water budgets also can accommodate equity concerns by charging lower prices for the most essential uses of water such as drinking, cooking, and cleaning (Mayer et al. 2008) . By keeping these prices low for every household regardless of size, water budgets tend to be more politically acceptable than standard IBR pricing (Hall 2009 ). Last, water budgets provide utilities with the ability to respond flexibly and immediately to evolving environmental and fiscal conditions with a pricebased regulatory instrument (Mayer et al. 2008) .
As of 2008, fewer than 14 California water utilities had implemented IBR water budgets (Mayer et al. 2008) , even though around 50% of all California water utilities were utilizing IBR pricing as of 2005 (Hanak 2005 ). Recently, though, there appears to be renewed interest in water budgets. This trend has been driven, in part, by California's 20 × 2020 Water Conservation Plan, which aims to reduce statewide per-capita urban water use by 20% before 2020 (CDWR 2010) . Between 2008 and , at least nine southern California water utilities adopted water budgets as part of their efforts to comply with the plan. 2 Despite the potential advantages offered by water budgets and renewed interest by utilities, there remain widespread uncertainties and concerns about switching to such a price structure. A prominent concern, and the focus of this study, is the extent to which water budgets actually reduce demand. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the demand effect may be quite large. For example, the IRWD reports that in the 13 years following the introduction of water budgets, average per-acre outdoor water use declined by 61% (IRWD 2013). However, statistics such as this can be misleading because observed changes in demand are the product of multiple competing effects. For example, changes in the broader economy can drive per-capita water demand up or down as prices and incomes fluctuate. Changes in weather and climate, such as cyclical precipitation patterns or regional temperature trends, are important drivers of outdoor water use. Changes in the availability of, and preferences for, water-conserving technologies (such as weather-based irrigation systems and lowflow toilets and sprinkler heads) can reduce demand. And even population growth can reduce per-capita demand if new homes must be built with such water-efficient technologies. To determine the effect of introducing a water budget rate structure on demand, these other factors must be accounted for.
Another related issue is the transferability of results from one water utility, such as IRWD, to others. The extent to which a water budget rate structure impacts demand depends on the features of the rate structure and how those features compare to the rate structure that it replaces: water budgets with smaller blocks and higher prices should have greater effects on demand, ceteris paribus. Therefore we might not expect the outcome for a particular water utility to be relevant for other utilities, unless those utilities intend to adopt similarly structured water budgets and have similar customer bases. Although rate structures clearly will differ across utilities, there is one fairly common feature that can be used as a convenient benchmark to increase the transferability of results across utilities. In many cases, such as the southern California examples cited above, utilities will desire to maintain fiscal neutrality when switching from uniform rates to water budgets in order to avoid incurring budgetary surpluses or deficits. Indeed, under California's Proposition 218, revenues derived from water fees cannot exceed the funds required to provide the service (ACWA 2007) ; in other words, utilities must set their rates to balance revenues with costs. Focusing on fiscally neutral rate structures thus narrows the scope of the investigation while promoting broader applicability of the results.
With these issues in mind, this study estimates the effect of introducing a fiscally neutral water budget rate structure on residential demand in the Eastern Municipal Water District (EMWD) of southern California. The dataset follows over 13,000 single family households with continuous monthly water use records from 2003 to 2012. We account for socioeconomic differences across households and through time with data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census and Bureau of Economic Analysis. We control for climate variability with spatially and temporally variable estimates of evapotranspiration. We include a time trend to capture changes in preferences and technologies, and we hold the housing stock fixed in our sample to control for vintage effects.
We estimate that EMWD reduced water demand by approximately 17% by switching to a fiscally neutral water budget rater structure, although the reduction was achieved gradually over more than three years. As intermediate steps we derive estimates of price and income elasticities that rely only on the longitudinal variability in our panel dataset. We investigate how different subpopulations of households responded to the pricing change and find convincing evidence that marginal, rather than average, prices are driving consumption choices. We also use a discrete-continuous choice model of water demand under IBR pricing to derive alternative rate structures that might have been implemented, and compare their estimated demand effects with the actual rate structure that was implemented. We find that additional demand reductions could be achieved by increasing particular block prices or decreasing particular block volumes, or by removing, splitting, or adding additional blocks in simple ways, while maintaining stable revenue per unit. From these observations we draw some implications for water utilities that are considering implementing water budgets and discuss directions for future work.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
The literature on residential water demand and pricing is large. Dalhuisen et al. (2003) provide an overview as part of their metaanalysis of 64 pricing studies between 1963 and 2001. A significant analytical innovation was provided by Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) who demonstrate how the discretecontinuous choice (DCC) framework of Burtless and Hausman (1978) can be applied to structural analysis of water demand under block rate pricing. Recent empirical studies using the DCC framework include work by Pint (1999) , Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins (2007) , Olmstead (2009), and Miyawaki, Omori, and Hibiki (2011) . However, many studies continue to use reduced-form demand estimation for block rate analysis (Fordyce 2005 , cited by Olmstead 2009), perhaps due to the computational difficulty of estimating the DCC model.
The DCC model has been critiqued recently by Strong and Smith (2010) who argue that applied welfare analysis is problematic within a DCC framework because, as noted by Bockstael and McConnell (1983) , the Marshallian demand function does not exist when the budget constraint is nonlinear. Strong and Smith instead propose estimating the structural parameters of the direct utility function for purposes of welfare analysis. However, largely due to the nature of their data, their approach stops short of a framework that permits individual consumers to locate at the kink points on their budget constraints, or that permits simulating changes in any aspect of the price structure, including scenarios that might cause consumers to move consumption to different facets of their budget constraints. 3 The main thrust of the most recent empirical work on IBR water pricing has been investigations of consumer price responsiveness, and whether price elasticities appear to differ across price structures. Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins (2007) find evidence that price elasticity does appear to differ between uniform and block rate price structures, but they are unable to provide a definitive conclusion due to unresolved endogeneity issues in their data. The main focus of our study is related to but distinct from this work. Rather than comparing parameter estimates under uniform and block rate structures, we estimate a uniform rate model that then is used to predict what demand would have been had IBR water budgets not been adopted. We then investigate the differences between observed and predicted demand to characterize the demand effect of water budgets. To our knowledge this is the first study to utilize IBR water budget pricing data, and the first to estimate the demand effect of introducing such a price structure.
III. EMPIRICAL SITUATION AND DATA
The data for this study come from the EMWD of southern California. EMWD is a member agency of the Metropolitan Water District of southern California and serves a diverse region of western Riverside County that includes the cities of Moreno Valley, Perris, Hemet, Murrieta, and Temecula. This region covers 542 square miles and has a population of over 768,000 (EMWD 2013 To analyze the demand effect of introducing water budgets, we identified 13,565 residential accounts with uninterrupted monthly water consumption records between January 2003 and September 2012. The fact that these accounts remained open is a good indication that there were no tenancy changes in these households during this period. 9 In addition to monthly water consumption data, EMWD also provided information on prices paid by each account, HHS and IA associated with each account, dates when households were asked to increase their water conservation efforts (e.g., due to system maintenance or local supply scarcity), monthly ET under water budgets for each of the 50 microclimates, and the relevant microclimate for each account. EMWD also provided the latitude and longitude of the meter for each account, which enables us to georeference against census data to obtain information on income and education at the tract level.
A crucial piece of missing data is microclimate ET during uniform rate pricing. During this period EMWD had no need for evapotranspiration data and thus did not track them. Obtaining these data directly from the commercial provider was prohibitively costly, so we developed a simple but effective model to estimate it. First we obtained publicly available evapotranspiration data from three CIMIS stations in western Riverside County. 10 We then regressed EMWD's available evapotranspiration data for each of the 50 climate zones on the CIMIS evapotranspira-9 An exception could be rental properties for which the utility accounts are registered to the owner rather than the tenants. We are not able to identify such accounts in our dataset.
10 CIMIS is the California Irrigation Management Information System, developed and maintained by the California Department of Water Resources (www.cimis.water. ca.gov).
tion data and a set of 12 monthly dummy variables as follows:
Here, is observed evapotranspiration for ET zt climate zone z during month t; is a con-β zm stant term that applies only to a given zone z and month m-in other words, there are 12 such coefficients for each zone; is a slope β z1 coefficient that is specific to zone z and that relates changes in ET at the first CIMIS station to observed changes in ET for zone z; and β z2 are defined similarly for the other two β z3 CIMIS stations;
is monthly ET at the first ET 1t CIMIS station, and similarly for the other stations; is the residual. ε t Equation [1] is estimated separately for each of the 50 climate zones using ordinary least squares to produce a set of coefficient estimates that is specific to each zone. Estimation results are very good. The mean absolute prediction error across all regressions is only 2.2%. The highest error for any month is 7%; the highest error for any zone is less than 4%. Adjusted R 2 values for the 50 zones are all between 0.976 and 0.992. We then use the coefficient estimates to predict ET values for the entire observation period and use these predictions in our analysis. Figure 1 presents a typical comparison of observed and predicted monthly ET values for a representative climate zone.
Summary statistics for the data used in the regression analyses that follow are presented in Table 1 . 11 Conservation requests refer to the fraction of months in which households were asked to increase water conservation efforts, typically due to system maintenance or heat waves. We do not include data on EMWD's other water conservation program efforts (e.g., rebates for high-efficiency toilets, washers, shower heads, and sprinkler nozzles), because the estimated savings from such programs amounts to less than 0.5% of residential deliveries. Nominal and real prices are the prices charged per hundred cubic feet (CCF) of water (one uniform rate from 2003 to 2008, and four increasing block rates from 2009 to 2012). Under uniform rate pricing, these prices are the same as the average prices paid by households. However under water budgets, the average price paid is a function 11 Data for 2012 is from January through September only and is thus omitted from the table for purposes of comparison. However it is worth noting that nominal block prices in 2012 are unchanged from 2011, and thus real block prices in 2012 are slightly lower than for 2011. Data for 2012 is included in the regression analyses.
of water consumed and thus differs from the prices charged. 12 As with Strong and Smith (2010) , budgets are based on census income (Minnesota Population Center 2011) and are adjusted for the fraction of income typically spent on the category of "utilities, fuels, and public services." (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2012). 13 Budgets also are adjusted for temporal changes in per-capita personal income for the Ontario-Riverside-San Bernardino metropolitan statistical area (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013). Education is expressed as the fraction of the census tract reporting "some college" or more education (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2012). Household size, irrigated area, and education are treated as con-12 Average price paid in 2009 is a blend of uniform rates for January through March (nominally unchanged from 2008) and block rates for April through December (shown in the table).
13 Using data from the 2010 Consumer Expenditure Survey, we estimate the following relationship between budget and income for the range of incomes observed in (y) ( m) our sample:
, R 2 = 0.9915. Summary statistics under water budgets are shown by marginal consumption block in Table 2. The table shows that marginal consumption is within a household's water budget (block 1 or 2) in 82% of our observations. 15 Only 18% of our observations have marginal consumption in block 3 or 4. The table shows that household consumption increases with the marginal block, but water budgets do not: water budgets are largest for block 2 consumers and smallest for block 1 and 4 consumers. The large water budgets associated with block 2 consumption appear to be explained by higher evapotranspiration and irrigated area, whereas the household size is slightly below average. Block 3 and 4 consumers appear to be somewhat wealthier and thus perhaps less sensitive to the higher prices in those blocks; consequently they may be less inclined to make an effort to better match their water use with their water budgets.
14 Census data suggests that overall education levels in the study area remained fairly constant from 2000 to 2010.
15 This does not imply that 82% of households always consume within their water budgets. Marginal consumption for a given household tends to move across blocks through time.
IV. ESTIMATION STRATEGY
To facilitate comparisons, our analysis is based on a log-linear demand model similar to that used in previous studies of block rate water pricing (e.g., Hewitt and Hanemann 1995; Pint 1999; Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins 2007; Olmstead 2009 ):
Here, is demand by household (i) during w it month (t); is a vector of household, ecoz it nomic, and environmental characteristics that are thought to affect demand; is the marp it ginal water price faced by the household; y it is the household's budget for utilities and related expenditures;
captures unobserved η i preference heterogeneity;
is an error term ε it capturing the remaining unexplained variation in demand; and are parameters to be {δ,α,γ} estimated.
Equation [2] forms the basis for two separate estimations: (1) a uniform rate demand model estimated using 2003-2008 data, and (2) an IBR demand model estimated using 2009-2012 water budget data. 16 For the uniform rate demand model, we model unobserved preference heterogeneity as fixed effects and derive parameter estimates from an ordinary least squares regression on deviations of the variables in equation [2] from their respective means. 17 The model is then used to predict demand during 2009-2012 if uniform rate pricing had remained in effect. The predicted demand is then compared to the actual demand under water budgets, and the difference is analyzed to estimate the demand effect of the water budget rate structure. 16 Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins (2007) also use equation [2] as the basis for a combined estimation including both uniform and block rate pricing data, but find evidence that some parameter estimates (notably price and income elasticities) may differ across pricing structures. To allow for this possibility, we forego the combined estimation and perform two separate estimations. 17 We also estimated a random effects uniform rate model that is structurally more similar to the DCC framework. Coefficient estimates generally were similar to the fixed effects estimates, but the fixed effects model exhibits better overall predictive accuracy. For the IBR demand model, we implement a standard DCC model that assumes the unobserved preference heterogeneity is randomly distributed. The DCC framework models demand as a joint choice involving selection of a price block and the amount to consume within that block. The framework allows a household to optimally select a consumption level within a block or at the edge of a block (also called a "kink point" because the consumer's budget constraint has an abrupt change of slope at these points). Within a block, demand is given by equation [2] but is implicitly conditional on the choice of that block and thus is referred to as a "conditional demand." For expositional purposes below, we drop the subscripts i and t and rewrite equation [2] ; and the other notation is the same as in k equation [2] . It is apparent from equation [3] that the unobserved preference heterogeneity influences the block or kink point on (η) which the consumer desires to consume; and the additional error term explains the de-(ε) viation of actual consumption from estimated or "planned" consumption. Equation [3] is the basis for maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters in equation [2] . Waldman (2000 Waldman ( , 2005 provides a general statement of the likelihood function for the DCC model, which also forms the basis for predicting demand under IBR pricing. We also use this model to derive alternative rate structures that generate equivalent revenue per unit, and compare their estimated demand effects against the actual rate structure that was implemented by EMWD. ln w = lnw (p ,y ) + η + ε, lnw − ln w (p ,y ) < η ≤ ln w − ln w (p ,y ).
[3]
2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 * * ln w + ε, l nw − ln w (p ,y ) < η ≤ ln w − ln w (p ,y ) 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Uniform Rate Model
We estimated several different specifications of the demand model in equation [2] , and found that the performance of a relatively simple specification with few regressors was nearly indistinguishable from that of more complicated (and, for the DCC model, computationally burdensome) specifications. 18 Table 3 shows the variables used in the analysis along with the parameter estimates and standard errors for the uniform rate model. Note that a constant term, education, household size, and irrigated area do not appear in the table because they drop out of the fixed effects estimation; however, these terms do appear later in the DCC model. Table 3 summarizes results for seven different samples: the full sample (all 13,565 accounts); high, moderate, and low usage accounts (i.e., 2003-2008 average usage in the top, middle, and bottom thirds); and high, moderate, and low income accounts (i.e., 2010 census income in the top, middle, and bottom thirds). All estimated parameters are significantly different from zero at well above the 99% confidence level. Signs and magnitudes generally are intuitive and exhibit similarities across subsamples. Some noteworthy observations include the following.
Requests by the water district for increased water conservation efforts appear to produce a 5% reduction in demand during the month in which a request is made. This is not an insignificant response to a request for voluntary action to support a public good.
There appears to be a slight upward trend in overall water consumption through time (0.7% per year) after controlling for other variables affecting demand; however, the high-usage subsample exhibits a downward 18 It is also worth noting that both the uniform rate and water budget models include the appropriate Slutsky restriction as a constraint on the estimation. Slutsky restrictions are not always imposed on standard demand models (or, at least, not discussed in the subsequent analysis), but here the restriction plays an essential role in proper estimation of the DCC framework. In both models the restriction binds; without it, income effects appear much larger and some of the estimated block probabilities in equation [3] are negative.
trend. For the full sample, this amounts to a 4.3% increase in household consumption during the observation period. This unexpected result could reflect the housing bubble of the mid-2000s, to the extent that (1) rapidly rising home values through 2006 created an additional income effect and/or increased the perceived marginal benefit of investing in one's home (including landscaping and swimming pools), and (2) such investments and the associated increased water use were relatively permanent and thus not reversed during the period of rapidly declining home values beginning in 2007. However this is speculative and cannot be inferred directly from our dataset.
The estimated price elasticity (coefficient on ) for the full sample is − 0.76. This ln(p ) it estimate and the others for the subsamples are consistent with, though somewhat higher than, estimates from previous work that tend to average around − 0.4 to − 0.5, or around − 0.6 for longer time periods (Espey, Espey, and Shaw 1997; Dalhuisen et al. 2003) . Considering the subsample regressions, price elasticity appears to decrease monotonically with usage but exhibits a nonmonotonic trend with income. In absolute terms, we estimate that a 1% price increase would produce expected reductions of 0.159 CCF/month from a highusage account, 0.143 CCF/month from a moderate-usage account, and 0.095 CCF/month from a low-usage account. Thus the high-usage group is the most responsive in absolute terms, even though its price elasticity is lowest. The observed pattern in price elasticities across usage groups may reflect differing preferences for outdoor water use. Average irrigated areas for the high-, moderate-, and lowusage groups are 5,985, 3,512, and 3,034 square feet, respectively. The high-usage group appears qualitatively different in this regard, suggesting that it may be composed of households with strong preferences for outdoor landscaping who are more reluctant to reduce irrigation in response to price increases.
Income elasticities are estimated by interacting the budget elasticity (coefficient on ) with the derived relationship between ln(y ) it budget and income (see footnote 13). The estimated income elasticity for the full sample is 0.1616. This is close to but somewhat lower than most previous estimates: in a meta-dataset used by Dalhuisen et al. (2003) , the mean and median income elasticities were 0.43 and 0.24, respectively. Although our analysis exhibits several of the characteristics that were found by Dalhuisen et al. (2003) to be significantly correlated with higher income elasticity estimates, it appears that the Slutsky restriction is causing our estimate to be lower. 19 The model generally fits the data well, particularly when we consider average consumption through time, which is important for generating predictions beyond the observation period. Figure 3 shows the average monthly observed and predicted usage for the full sample. Analogous graphs for the six usage and income subsamples (not shown) exhibit similarly good predictions.
Demand Effect of Water Budgets
The uniform rate model can be used to estimate the demand effect of introducing water budgets in 2009. To do this, we create a new dataset that includes the same explanatory variables as in Table 3 but with values updated for the prediction period (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . We update conservation requests, evapotranspiration, and household budgets accordingly. We also create new seasonal dummies and extrap-olate the time trend into the prediction period. Finally we set prices equal to the annual average real prices paid under water budgets (shown in Table 1 ). Predicted demand thus corresponds to the hypothetical case where uniform rate pricing continued beyond 2008 and prices were increased such that they matched the average annual prices paid under water budgets. From the perspective of a water utility, this is a useful baseline from which to judge the demand effect of water budgets, since such a uniform rate structure would produce revenues equal to those of the water budget structure under the null hypothesis that there is no demand effect. Figure 4 summarizes the estimated demand effect. Figure 4a shows the 12-month moving averages for observed and predicted demand Figure 4a and 4b demonstrate that water budgets initially had a relatively small effect on residential water demand: between April 2009 and March 2010, both observed and predicted demand exhibit similar declines. As of March 2010, observed demand is only 1.4% lower than predicted demand. However, the demand effect clearly grows through time. As of March 2011, two years after implementation, the 12-month moving average for observed demand is 5.2% below that for predicted demand. As of March 2012, three years after implementation, the difference is 13.1%. More recently, as of September 2012, the difference grows to 16.8%. Water budgets appear to have had a significant effect on demand; however, it has required a substantial amount of time for that effect to be realized. 20 This result is consistent with the results of Dalhuisen, de Groot, and Nijkamp (2000) who find that households appear more responsive to price changes when they have had more time to adapt.
Another way to gauge the water budget effect is as follows. During the most recent 12-month period in our data, the average price paid per CCF under water budgets is 3.7% higher (in real terms) than the average price paid in 2008. Our model predicts that uniform rates would have had to increase by 34% to achieve the same level of demand observed during this period. Notably, the average marginal price paid during this period is 34% higher than in 2008. This suggests that marginal prices may be having a stronger influence on consumption than average prices, and 20 Omitting the time trend from the predictions decreases the estimated demand effect by around 2%. Residential water conservation programs also appear to have had a negligible impact on the estimated demand effect: the annual water savings from these programs were less than 0.5% of residential deliveries and decreasing from 2009 to 2012. helps to inform the ongoing debate on this subject. 21 Also of interest, average prices paid under water budgets declined from 2010 through 2012. This largely explains the corresponding increase in the 12-month moving average for predicted demand beginning in January 2011 (weather also played a role, but incomes were quite stable). However the 12-month moving average for observed demand remains essentially unchanged during 2011 and begins to turn up moderately only in 2012. During this period of price decreases, predicted demand increases by 15.7%, but observed demand increases by only 3.6%. This suggests that under water budgets, households may be gradually adopting relatively permanent water conservation habits as they learn how to use water more efficiently-habits that are largely retained even when prices subsequently decrease. This observation could motivate adding a subjective learning component to Borenstein's (2009) hypothesis about utility demand being driven by consumption "rules" that are fixed prior to a consumption period and updated only when feedback is received in the form of a bill.
Results for the high and moderate usage and income subsamples are generally the same as for the full sample: the introduction of water budgets caused consumption to decrease more than predicted if uniform rates had been set equal to the average prices paid under block rates. For the low usage and income subsamples, the water budget effect was strong enough to overcome decreases in average prices paid by these groups under increasing block rates. In other words, our model predicts increased demand by these groups if uniform rates were set equal to av-21 Ito (2014) finds strong evidence of consumer responsiveness to average rather than marginal prices for the case of electricity demand. Borenstein (2009) also finds evidence that electricity consumers are responding either to average price or expected marginal price (which entails averaging over uncertain consumption) rather than the actual marginal price paid. Nataraj and Hanemann (2011) conclude that water consumers do respond to changes in marginal price. The extent to which these discrepancies are due to fundamental differences between water and electricity consumption, and/ or between the price structures under investigation, is a topic for future work. erage prices paid under block rates, but we observe decreased demand. Not surprisingly, average marginal prices paid by these groups did increase under block rates. This again is strongly suggestive of the importance of marginal rather than average prices in determining residential water consumption levels.
Block Rate Model
Estimation results for the DCC model are shown in Table 4 . Parameter estimates can be interpreted directly as the effect of each regressor on conditional demand (i.e., holding block choice fixed); simulations are needed to interpret the effect of each regressor on unconditional demand. As with the uniform rate model, the parameter estimates generally have intuitive signs and magnitudes and are all significantly different from zero at well above the 99% level. Similar to Gilg and Barr (2006) , we find a positive relationship between water use and education and, somewhat unexpectedly, a slightly larger coefficient on the fall dummy than on the summer dummy. Conservation requests appear to have a larger effect under water budgets (though only one such request was made, in January 2011), and the time trend is now negative.
At the household level, the model fit is not particularly good. When we evaluate expected household consumption as *
and different portions of the distribution of correspond to different conditional demand η curves, we get an adjusted R 2 value less than zero. 22 When we set and equal to their η ε means (zero) and evaluate expected household consumption as , we get an ad-
justed R 2 value of 0.1661. Although the first approach is the correct one, close inspection of the results reveals that the disturbance term simulations, in conjunction with our convex demand function, produce some very large simulated consumption values that tend to reduce the model fitness. However this approach provides a good fit to the average monthly data, as can be seen in Figure 5 . Price and income elasticities are estimated by simulating the demand effects of a 1% increase in all prices, and a 1% increase in household incomes, throughout the water budget observation period. Results are shown in Table 4 . Both estimates are less than their uniform rate counterparts. The price elasticity estimate ( − 0.58) is very close to those reported by Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins (2007) for a log-linear DCC model of IRB pricing, which ranges from − 0.59 to − 0.61. 22 We use multidimensional quadrature (Judd 1999) to evaluate the expectation. We use Gauss-Legendre quadrature to integrate over the piecewise distribution of and η Gauss-Hermite quadrature to integrate over . ε The income elasticity estimate (0.05) is close to that estimated by Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins (2007) in a random effects model of uniform rate pricing ( 0.04) but below ϳ their DCC estimates for IBR pricing ( 0.18), ϳ all of which they note are low compared to previous estimates. Those authors cite evidence that omitting household characteristics from the regression (as is common in previous studies) tends to increase the estimated income elasticity due to correlations between those characteristics and income. Because our fixed (uniform rate) and random effects (water budgets) panel data specifications implicitly capture all constant household characteristics, this may help to explain our relatively low income elasticity estimates.
Demand Effects of Alternative Water Budget Rate Structures
As described above, EMWD has implemented a relatively sophisticated water budget rate structure with four blocks that vary in magnitude across households and through time. The rate structure was designed, in part, to be fiscally neutral. Although we cannot use our limited data on household demand to rigorously test for fiscal neutrality, we can investigate how the existing rate structure could be modified such that demand is further reduced with limited fiscal impact. To address this question we consider alternative rate structures that maintain equivalent revenue per unit. Although this does not guarantee fiscal neutrality in all cases, such rate structures should have small fiscal impacts for utilities operating on relatively uniform average costs curves that are characteristic of industries with economies of scale, while also being politically acceptable to implement. The demand effects of such alternative rate structures could be of interest not only to utilities that already have implemented water budgets and are now facing relatively extreme circumstances (e.g., acute drought, rapid population growth, prolonged supply scarcity), but also to utilities that are in the process of designing or redesigning their water budgets. While there are many alternative structures to consider, here we focus on some relatively simple modifications to EMWD's existing rate structure that intuitively could be of interest. For each scenario, we find the parameters of the hypothetical rate structure that produce the same expected revenue per CCF as the current rate structure, and we compare the associated expected demand against that for the current rate structure. For all scenarios we use the data from the most recent 12-month period in our dataset as the basis for the simulations. Figure 6 summarizes the effects of several rate structures that reduce demand below the current baseline while maintaining stable revenue per unit. 23 Scenarios 1-7 maintain the existing rate structure but make changes to its quantity and price parameters. Utilities might 23 In all cases the expected revenue per CCF is within 0.5% of the baseline. We investigated other rate structures that ultimately could not maintain similar revenue per unit and are thus not reported here.
FIGURE 6
Demand Effects of Alternative Water Budget Rate Structures take such actions in response to intense shortterm drought conditions or unexpected reductions in supply. A simple but effective alternative is scenario 2 (20% decrease in block 2 size), which would decrease expected demand by 4.3% while maintaining stable revenues per unit of water consumed. This has about the same demand effect as scenario 5, which reallocates one-fourth of block 2 into block 3 but leaves the sum of blocks 2 and 3 unchanged (whereas scenario 2 reduces this sum by decreasing the size of block 2). Scenarios 6-7 examine the demand effect of reallocating additional block 2 water into block 3, and show that the effect increases sharply. Reallocations like these might be justified by a water utility as a means to implement new expectations for irrigation efficiency and use of native landscaping in place of turfgrass. Scenario 8 considers simplifying the rate structure by removing the "wasteful" water use block, and shows that a simultaneous 35% increase in the block 3 price would reduce demand slightly while maintaining stable average revenue. Alternatively, scenario 9 considers complicating the rate structure by adding a new block between blocks 2 and 3 with a price that maintains the increasing block rate structure, and finds a demand effect similar to that in scenario 8.
Overall these simulations suggest that there are relatively small conservation gains to be realized from fundamentally changing the existing rate structure by adding or removing blocks when fiscal neutrality must be maintained. Rather, most of the conservation potential appears to be associated with changes in the existing blocks 2 and 3. This is perhaps not surprising because the marginal consumption of most households occurs within these blocks.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This study utilizes a high-quality panel dataset of household water consumption for a large southern California water district to estimate the demand effect of switching from uniform rate pricing to fiscally neutral increasing block rate water budgets. More than three years after the rate structure changed, we estimate that demand under water budgets was 17% below where it would have been under a comparable uniform rate price structure. Whereas average prices paid rose by less than 4% under the block rate structure, average prices paid under the uniform rate structure would have had to rise by nearly 34% to achieve the same demand reduction. These results suggest that water budgets are poten-tially a highly effective conservation tool, although a substantial amount of time is required for demand reductions to be realized. Furthermore, to the extent that more complicated water budget structures are both more costly to implement and harder for consumers to understand (and thus respond to), our findings suggest that utilities can safely pursue relatively simpler rate structures, with perhaps only three blocks, without foregoing significant conservation opportunities.
Our analysis also finds some evidence of a price-induced "ratcheting effect" whereby households that are faced with higher water prices-particularly higher marginal prices that are characteristic of IBR structureslearn how to be more water efficient, adopt those new habits, and thus are less prone to "back-sliding" if and when prices decline in the future. This finding, although somewhat circumstantial, is consistent with Borenstein's (2009) hypothesis about the formation of consumption rules in electricity demand analysis and lends additional legitimacy to related modeling efforts including formal investigations of learning and habit formation in utility demand contexts.
For water utilities that are considering adopting water budgets as a conservation tool, this study provides strong support for doing so and also facilitates effective communication to stakeholders of the benefits provided by such rate structures. An important caveat is that conservation goals may take years to achieve. Efforts to promote quicker relearning of water consumption habits should hasten the attainment of those goals, but exactly how to go about doing this is a topic for future work. A potentially fruitful line of research would investigate the extent to which nonprice instruments and/or neighborhood effects influence learning and habit formation. Some water utilities have begun reporting local average water consumption on individual bills to give households a better idea of how their own consumption compares to a relevant peer group. Such information, combined with a high marginal price for "excessive" water use, could prove to be a highly effective approach to encouraging urban water conservation.
